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Abstract
Being married may raise worker productivity and increase the probability of 
remaining in a  job and, as consequence, obtaining a wage premium. Yet, this 
effect may be different for males and females. In developing countries, such as 
Colombia, the premium may be larger than in developed countries due to the 
differing social norms and labor market structures. Using cross-sectional data 
from Colombian Household Surveys, this paper examines the marriage wage 
premium and its evolution in Colombia both at the aggregate level and by gen-
der. We find a marriage wage premium for both male and female populations; 
this wage premium is explained by the greater human capital endowment in 
married people and to employer favoritism due to the “social norms” which 
consider being married an appropriate behavior and reward it. 
Resumen
Estar casado podría aumentar la productividad de los trabajadores y aumentar sus 
posibilidades de conservar su puesto de trabajo y como consecuencia, un salario 
mayor. Sin embargo, este efecto puede ser diferente si consideramos el género. 
En los países en desarrollo, como Colombia, la prima salarial puede ser mayor 
que en los países desarrollados debido a las normas sociales y diferencias en la 
estructura del mercado laboral. Usando la Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares 
(GEIH), este trabajo examina la existencia de la prima salarial por matrimonio 
en Colombia y su evolución, se hace para toda la población y diferenciando por 
género. Encontramos una prima salarial matrimonio para ambas poblaciones 
masculina y femenina; esta prima salarial se explica por la mayor dotación de 
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capital humano en las personas casadas y al favoritismo empleador debido a las "normas sociales" 
que consideran el matrimonio como una conducta apropiada y se recompensa. 
1. Introduction
Marriage creates the need to rethink the way men and women participate in the labor market due to 
the interdependence of the decisions that individuals have to make once they decide to be together. 
For this reason policymakers in the United States (Ahituv, A., & Lerman, R. I., 2005) build family-re-
lated provisions into welfare legislation, conscious of the link between family structures and poverty.
This interdependence, in turn, affects employer’s behavior due to the presence of associated factors, 
such as trustworthiness, stability, and the productivity of the employee, creating different treatment of 
married and non-married populations. Moreover, employer behavior may be different for individuals 
of different genders due to the different roles that males and females have within households. While 
there is some evidence that shows a wage premium independent of the individual´s gender (Hidalgo, 
1999); other studies indicate that married men earn more than non-married men, but married women 
do not earn more than non-married women.  This phenomenon for females is called the motherhood 
penalty. In Colombia women without children earn on average 1.73% more than mothers (Gamboa, L. 
F., & Zuluaga, B., 2013). However, (Olarte, L. & Peña, X., 2010) found that the motherhood penalty is 
17.6%. Therefore, the existing evidence on the size of the penalty is not conclusive. 
The effects of marriage on men and women’s wages can be ambiguous; it depends on the hou-
sehold role of each partner and their labor force participation, as well as the household structure. In 
accordance with Social Trends Institute & Child Trends (2014), in Colombia 20% of the population 
in the reproductive age, ranging between 18 and 49 years old, is legally married, the lowest share in 
Central and South America and worldwide.  This rate can be compared to the share in Costa Rica of 
62% and in Egypt of 80%. This estimate of the Colombian share coincides with the results of the Gran 
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares, that found shares of 21.9% in 2008, 20.9% in 2011, and 20.6% in 2013.
According to Charry (2004) women’s labor participation has increased substantially in recent 
decades. As such, Colombia is an excellent country to study marital wage gaps in the context of an 
emerging country that formerly had a traditional  family structure. 
Researchers have had less interest in the marital wage premium for women,  This paper analyzes 
this issue because we argue that women are increasinglyi important to the labor market. There are 
several studies of marriage wage premium in many countries or places such as the United States, 
Denmark, Great Britain, China, South Africa, Australia, Sweden among others, but in South America 
Brazil is the only country with a study of the marital wage premium. This paper is the first to examine 
this premium in Colombia.  
This paper explores marriage wage premium (or penalty) in Colombia and its evolution over time 
using data from the Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares for the years 2008, 2011 and 2013 (GEIH 
2008, 2011 and, 2013). These years were selected because these surveys have national representation 
and comparability and allow an overview of developments over a timeline of five years. To ensure 
the robustness of our results we employ parametric and non-parametric methods that allow a more 
accurate estimation of the marriage wage premium.  In particular, we use the two methodologies of 
Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) and Ñopo (2009).
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Countries encourage marriage for several reasons, including the advantages  of sharing labor 
market participation and household tasks, better conditions for children, and higher incomes for 
the household.  All the papers we examined in the literature find that the wage gap benefit married 
people or those cohabiting, which suggests that in most families where there is marital union there 
is less poverty. 
We still have many questions to answer: ¿Why is Colombia one of the countries with the highest 
percentage of children living without either parent? ¿Or why has Colombia the lowest percentage 
of married couples? In the United States there is considerable discussion of  these issues, as well as 
whether or not to encourage healthy marriages to avoid poverty and reduce out-of-wedlock births.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a brief literature review. The third 
section explains the empirical strategy. The fourth section presents the data.  The fifth secton present 
the results.  The sixth section presents the conclusions. 
2. Literature review
A. Why is there a wage premium?
The empirical findings on wage differences in the literature suggest that there is commonly a 
premium for married versus non-married men and a penalty for women in the same circumstances 
(Hill, 1979) (Korenman & Newmark, 1990)(Jacobsen & Rayack, 1996), leading to a persistent gender 
gap. The explanation for this difference is that remuneration in the labor market for married women 
is less than for men because women perform more household work. 
Becker G. (1971, 1981, 1985) developed a marriage theory, also known as the specialization hypo-
thesis or causal explanation, that married women are focused on home production, allowing married 
men to focus on activity in the labor market. In addition,the greater increase in human capital and 
wages of married men is due to a productivity gap relative to non-married men, while married wo-
men exhibit the opposite effect.  
Korenman & Neumark (1991) adopt the ideas of Becker and conclude that 20% of married men´s 
wage difference is attributable to marital invariant factors over time, such as real work experience, 
the geographical area, conditions of self-employment, the presence of dependents, and union. Fur-
ther, married men get better performance evaluations, more frequent promotions, and rapid salary 
increases after marriage. Gray (1997), using data from the National Longitudinal Surveys, found a 
decrease in the marital wage premium and decreased productivity associated with marriage over 
time; instrumental variables estimation suggests that the declining productivity effects can be exp-
lained by a reduction in the average degree of specialization combined with an increase in the wage 
penalty associated with wives’ labor market participation. Datta Gupta, Smith, & Stratton (2007) 
estimated the wage gap for married men in Denmark using OLS and found a premium between 3.2 
and 4%; they attributed the low premium to a trend toward  more equal division of household labor.
Chun & Lee (2001) examined the causes behind their findings that show a higher salary for 
married men over their unmarried counterparts. They concluded that the marital wage premium is 
positively related to the degree of specialization within the household, but that factors such as human 
capital, race, and geographic location may explain a larger share of the gap. Korenman & Newmark 
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(1990) carried out an analysis of wage differentials between married and unmarried women with 
and without children in the United States, using data from 1982 and a subsample from 1980.  They 
concluded that there is no penalty on wages for married women or for maternity because they did 
not find a causal relationship between marriage, motherhood, and wages. Bellas (1992) found that 
male faculty with homemaking spouses not only had higher salaries than men whose wives were 
employed, but also that they published significantly more scholarly articles and books. Birch & Miller 
(2006) found that men benefit from labor specialization within marriage, because those who have 
working wives earned 12% less than those whose wives remained at home. 
The selection hypothesis raises the possibility that marriage is correlated with unobserved attribu-
tes that are valued in the labor market such as integrity, the work ethic, and honesty, among others. 
It differs from the causal explanation in the direction of causality; the implication is that married 
people are more productive, not because they become more productive after marriage, but because 
they were more productive before marriage. 
Using fixed effects panel methods, Dougherty (2006), Rodgers & Stratton (2010) and Casale & Posel 
(2010) tested this hypothesis, controlling for human capital, family background, years of marriage, 
and job training. Their results were consistent with the idea that income increases with maturation 
and that the effect is evident at least five years before marriage, and maybe even a few years earlier. 
There is a growing wage premium after one year, at which time the premium is 14%. The premium 
continues to rise for a few years after marriage, reaching a maximum of 19 or 20 percent, and then 
stabilizes. Antonovics & Town (2004), using data on monozygotic twins, found within pairs of twins 
that the twin who marries receives a wage premium of 30%. 
On the other hand, Ginther & Zavodny (2001) studied the marriage premium derived from the 
selection hypothesis, focusing on the effect of unexpected marriages, finding differences in the wages 
of married men with premarital conception and shotgun weddings. Bardasi & Taylor (2008) suggest 
that employers use marriage as a signal for unobservable characteristics that are valued by wives 
and employers without rejecting the reasoning proposed by Becker. Likewise, Geist (2005) examined 
the effect of marital status on wages of men and women from 15 countries using data from Wave 
V of the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS). Her study concludes that there is a universal premium for 
the wages of married men that can be explained by human capital and selection.
In the third hypothesis, discrimination, Nock (2005) argues that social norms favor marriage, 
family, and stable relationships; employers consciously or not, reward them. Hersch & Stratton 
(2000) using fixed effects models of panel data found the marriage premium is not primarily due to 
the selection of more productive men into marriage. Married men could get preferential treatment 
from employers, such as more training or promotions, or men could become better workers because 
of the job stability induced by marriage. 
Jacobsen & Rayack (1996) present evidence of a wage premium for traditional marriage to be 
explained by discrimination. Hill´s (1979) analysis includes detailed controls for human capital, work 
history, health status, industry, and the number of children. Using data from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID 1976), she found a marriage premium for men (and no effect of marriage 
status on women’s wages) as a result of statistical discrimination. Using the methodology of quan-
tile treatment effect, Maasoumi, Millimet, & Dipanwita (2009) conclude that discrimination plays an 
important role for low-wage workers.
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Finally, (Lincoln, 2008) (Greenhalgh, 1980) (Richardson, 2000) (Loh, 1996) find unlikely that the 
marriage premium is caused only by productivity differences between married and unmarried wor-
kers. They attribute an unexplained portion of the premium to selection and employer favoritism.
3. Empirical Strategy
We use two techniques to analyze the marital wage premium in Colombia: the first one is Blinder-Oa-
xaca (1973) and the second is Ñopo (2009). We use both techniques because they have different 
strengths as analytic methodologies. Blinder-Oaxaca (B-O) has two advantages, 1) It separately 
calculates the effects of worker endowments and paymentss and, 2) It separates the coefficient for 
each comparison group that can be measured for each endowment (Cassells & McNamara, 2009). 
The Ñopo technique is more disaggregated in that it recognizes the difference of both groups in the 
support, and for that reason, not all the married people are comparable to the non-married (Ñopo, 
2008). Ñopo decomposes wages by the distribution of the variables and provides a more accurate 
estimate of the wage gap than B-O.
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition involves estimating separate equations of Mincer-type earnings 
for each study group (married/non-married, male married/non-married, female married/non-ma-
rried) which decomposes the differential found to two causes 1) the differences between allocations 
attributed to groups, or to controlled observable characteristics, such as human capital variables and 
2) the existence of differences in payments attributable to non-observable characteristics, such as 
productivity, quality of education, vocational training, family history and local labor market conditions. 
(Fortin, Lemiux, & Firpo, 2010)
To formalize, the wage gap is given by:
Where, ln Wm and ln Wn are the estimates of the natural log of married and non-married wages, 
respectively. From separate wage regressions by group, Xm and Xn are vectors of the mean values of 
the married and non-married characteristics. Finally Bm and Bn are vectors of the estimated regression 
coefficients from the married and non-married wage regressions.
By rearranging this expression, we obtain the decomposition of wage differentials to their causes:
Thereby:
Bm  (Xm  - Xn ) = Portion of the differences in payments attributable to the differential in endowments.
Xn (Bm - Bn ) = Portion of the differences in payment although having the same endowments.
B-O has some shortcomings that could generate drawbacks in the results; these are: The decompo-
sition of Blinder-Oaxaca provides information only about the average wage gap and does not provide 
information on the rest of the distribution. On the other hand, it does not restrict the comparison to 
comparable individuals that could generate bias in the results. Additionally, (Heckman, 1979) argues 
lnWm - lnWn = Xm Bm - Xn Bn
lnWm - lnWn = Bm  (Xm  - Xn ) - Xn (Bm - Bn )
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that a correction for selection bias is required in this regression because not all participants in the 
labor market have positive wages, yet we do not include this correction.
For these reasons, we also use a non-parametric matching approach, introduced by Ñopo (2009). 
The observable characteristics of married and non-married people are used to match both groups, 
decomposing the part of the distribution that is within the common support and out of the common 
support. 
In this approach to model the individuals’ earnings let Y denote the outcome, X the individual 
characteristics, and FM and FN the cumulative distribution function that conditions the characteris-
tics of each individual of the two groups respectively. The relationship between the expected value, 
conditioning on the characteristics and the marital status, is represented by gM (x) and gN (x).
(1)
(2)
To estimate the wage gap we use the difference of the wage’s expected value for the distribution 
of characteristics for married SM, and the distribution of characteristics for non-married SN, as follow:
(3)
Replacing equations (1) and (2) into (3), we have:
(4)
Now we divide each integral into two parts, where each one contains the intersection of the 
common support and out of the support. Considering that the distribution SN is different than SM:
(5)
After some algebraic manipulation, we have four components:
(6)
E [ Y | M ] = ∫S M g 
M (x) dFM (x)
E [ Y | N ] = ∫S N g 
N (x) dFN (x)
Δ = ∫S N  g 
M (x) dFM (x) - ∫S N g 
N (x) dFN (x)
Δ = [ ∫S N  S M g M (x) dFM (x) + ∫S N  S M g M (x) dF M (x)]
- [ ∫S N  S M g N (x) dFN (x) + ∫S N  S M g N (x) dF N (x)]
Δ = E [ Y | M ] - E [ Y | N ]
+ [ ∫S M  g N (x) dF 
N (x)
μN (SM)
 - ∫S M  g 
N (x)
 
dF N (x)
μN (S M)  ] μN (S 
M)
Δ = ∫S M  S N  [ g 
M (x) - g N (x) ]
 
dF N (x)
μN (SM)
 + [∫S N  g M (x) dF 
M (x)
μM (S N)  
- ∫S N g 
M (x) dF 
M (x)
μM (S N) ] μM (S N)
+ ∫S M  S N  g 
M (x)
 [dF 
M (x)
μM (SN)
 -
 
dF N (x)
μN (S M)  ] (x)
Δ = Δ0 + ΔM + ΔF + ΔX
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The first component can determine the discrimination given the unobservable characteristics. 
And, the last three ΔX + ΔM + ΔF can be attributed to differences in the observable characteristics.
Δ0 = ∫S M  S N  [ g 
M (x) - g N (x) ]
 
dF N (x)
μN (SM)  
: This component of the wage gap can be attributable to the 
unobserved characteristics. (Discrimination) 
ΔM = [∫S N  g M (x) dF 
M (x)
μM (S N)  
- ∫S N g 
M (x) dF 
M (x)
μM (S N) ] μM (S N): It is the part of the wage gap explained by the 
differences in characteristics between unmatched and matched married people. 
ΔN = [∫S M  g N (x) dF 
N (x)
μN (S M)  
- ∫S M g 
M (x) 
 
dF N (x)
μN (S M)   ] μM (S 
M): It is a portion of the wage gap that results from 
the differences in characteristics between unmatched and matched non-married people. 
ΔX = ∫S M  S N  g 
M (x)
 [dF 
M (x)
μM (SN)  - 
dF N (x)
μN (S M)  ] (x) : It considers the common support in the distribution of the observed characteristics of married and non-married people. 
The basis for our dependent variable is the logarithm of the personal individual wage per hour 
for each year. We use it because is more appropriate to measure the productivity of each individual. 
The transformation to log form is convenient because the empirical distribution of the logarithm of 
the income is closer to a normal distribution than the income distribution, also because the change 
in the logarithm per hour corresponds to the percentage change in the personal income per hour.
The set of control variables used to make the decomposition to measure human capital are the 
following: education (measured as years of schooling), experience (measured in years of work ex-
perience and with learning by doing) and experience squared; these variables are taken from the 
equation proposed by Mincer (1974). Furthermore, we include the sectors of the economy, namely, 
the primary sector that covers agriculture (dummy); the secondary sector, related to commerce and 
industry with low technology and the rest of manufacturing (dummy); and the tertiary sector which 
covers the services (water, gas, banks, finances, etc) but is not included in the model. Lastly, we use 
a dummy in case the population resides in an urban area. 
4. Data
The empirical analysis uses data from the Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH 2008, 2011 and 
2013) collected by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). The GEIH survey 
collects information about household conditions, the composition and characteristics of the household, 
education, health, and labor market participation. The GEIH (2008, 2011 and, 2013) cover 24 principal 
cities, county seats, and rural areas.  These surveys have national coverage, and they allow inference of 
population parameters through the use of expansions factors to maintain representativeness. Within 
the surveys, the expansion factors were divided into 12, which correspond to each month of the year.
Considering the importance of the data offered by these surveys, we sought to analyze what 
happens in terms of marriage wage premium during this period of time. To identify the wage pre-
miums, we restrict the data in some dimensions. As the wage- setting process is different according 
to employment status, we only consider employees in the private and public sectors. We exclude 
individuals over retirement age (65 years old) and under the average age of marriage in Colombia 
(21 years). In addition, individuals who did not provide information about wages, education, marital 
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status, or age were excluded from the data. The cities are heterogeneous; for this reason, we plan to 
include this variable in further studies.
In the literature it is conventional to restrict the analysis to legally-married individuals to test for 
the preferential treatment of employers. Also, studies of the marital wage premium typically treat 
separated and divorced couples similarly.
For comparison we separate the sample between men, women, and the total population between 
married/non-married as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Characteristics Married Non-married Married Non-married Married Non-married
2008 2011 2013
A. Total population
Age 41.35 (9.67) 35.21 (10.28) 41.97 (9.92) 34.82 (10.32) 42.30 (9.75) 35.11 (10.54) 
Hourly wage ($) 4791.90 (3872.2)
 3479.88 
(2816.58)
5914.2 (4636.52) 
3961.684 
(3156.223) 
6206.427 
(5121.18)
4363.901 
(3507.42)
Years of 
schooling 9.98 (4.81) 9.19 (4.49) 10.98 (4.68) 9.55   (4.38)  10.74    (4.73)  9.65    (4.48)
Experience 25.36 (11.36) 20.02 (11.78) 24.91 (11.37) 19.23 (11.90)  25.55    (11.62)  19.46    (12.3) 
Lives in urban 
area 76% 70,87% 79.79% 71,52% 76,81% 73,76%
Lives in rural 
area 24% 29,12% 20.20% 28,47% 23,18% 26,23%
Sectors of the economy
Primary % 20,18% 24,19% 16,20% 19,32% 10,62% 13,96%
Secondary % 22,91% 30,38% 24,86% 34,98% 23,96% 36,26%
Tertiary % 56,9% 45,42% 58,93% 45,69% 65,4% 49,76%
Employee type
Private 
Employee 70% 83,63% 72,28% 87,30% 74,93% 88,20%
Public Employee 30% 16,63% 27,71% 12,69% 25,06% 11,72%
B. Women
Age 40.02 (9.20) 35.70 (10.15) 41.01 (9.63) 35.14 (10.18) 41.12 (9.33) 34.52 (10.25) 
Hourly wage ($)
5691.78 
(4069.03) 
3892.55 
(3128.33)
7069.84 
(5155.16)
4290.97 
(3633.72)
7437.07 (5790.71) 
4760.829 
(4102.67)
Years of 
schooling 12.54 (4.08) 10.99 (4.18) 13.07 (3.86) 11.09 (4.04) 12.7 (4.23) 11.43 (3.97)
Experience 21.45 (10.06) 18.71 (11.33) 21.91 (10.24)  18.07 (11.32) 22.42 (10.71) 17.09 (11.31) 
Lives in urban 
area 80.48% 82.69% 88,88% 81,82% 83,68% 81.66%
Lives in rural 
area 19.51% 17.3% 11,11% 18,17% 16,31% 18.33%
Sectors of the economy
Primary 8.57% 9.17% 6,32% 7,76% 1.83% 3.97%
Secondary 21.87% 32.72% 22,14% 41,52% 23,24% 43.35%
Tertiary 69.55% 58.09% 71,53% 50.71% 74,92% 52.66%
Employee type
Private 
Employee 56,82% 73,16% 59,14% 80,66% 62,78% 82,64%
Public Employee 43,17% 26,83% 40,85% 19,33% 37,21% 17,35%
C. Men
Age 42 (9.82) 34.95 (10.34) 42.48 (10.03) 31.07 (9.72) 42.91 (9.90) 35.46 (10.68)
Hourly wage ($)
4354.87
(3694.69) 
3252.30 
(2601.03)  
5293.36 
(4203.12)
3784.72 (2851.27)
5560.86 
(4602.53) 
4132.627 
(3085.01) 
Years of 
schooling 8.75 (4.65) 8.20 (4.35) 9.84 (4.70) 8.71 (4.33) 9.71 (4.65) 8.61 (4.43) 
Experience 27.24 (11.48) 20.74 (11.95) 26.55 (11.63) 19.86 (12.16) 27.20 (11.75) 20.84 (12.63)
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Characteristics Married Non-married Married Non-married Married Non-married
2008 2011 2013
Lives in urban 
area 73.82% 64,36% 74,92% 65,98% 73.20% 69.16%
Lives in rural 
area 26.17% 35,63% 25,07% 34,01% 26.79% 30.83%
Sectors of the economy
Primary 25.82% 32,47% 21,50% 25,54% 15.22% 19.78%
Secondary 23.41% 29,08% 26,32% 31,46% 24.35% 32.13%
Tertiary 50.75% 38,43% 52,16% 42.99% 60.41% 48.07%
Employee type
Private 
Employee 77.01% 89,41% 79,35% 90.86% 81,31% 91,54%
Public Employee 22,89% 10,58% 20,64% 9,13% 18,68% 8,45%
For the years studied non-married people have lower wage than their counterparts, although, 
married people on average are increasing their level of education. The hourly wage  calculated from 
the principal wage divided by the working hours for the principal employment shows that there is a 
wage gap between married women and non-married women, also for married men and non-married 
men. For married women the average hourly wage gap is increasing rapidly through time. Similarly 
for married men the hourly wage gap increases between 2008 and 2011 and then it stabilizes around 
42%. These gaps are not comparable because of the existence of different characteristics related to 
earnings, such as schooling, experience, age, sectors of the economy, and employee type that indicates 
if the worker works in the public or private sector.
The mean age for married workers is between 41 years old and 42 years old, in 2011 the difference 
between married and unmarried is about 7 years, and in 2013 as well. 
Comparing the participation of the labor force in the sectors of the economy, we observe that for 
2008 and 2011 married people had a greater participation in the tertiary sector of economy. However, 
in the tertiary sector the participation increases through the years and decreases in the primary 
sector. On average more government employees are married than non-married.
5. Results
Table 2: Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
 Difference(lnWm- lnWn)
Endowment
(Xm- Xn) ßm
Coefficient
Xn (ßm - ßn)
Interaction
(em - en)
A. Total Population
2008 27.2%*** 16.19%*** 7.38%*** 3.63%**
2011 34,71%*** 25,32%*** 6,09%*** 3,28%
2013 30.44%*** 22.6%*** 11.42%*** -3%*
B. Women
2008 36.08%*** 24.52%*** 9.09%*** 2.45%
2011 47,92%*** 37,78%*** 7,56%*** 2,57%
2013 43.56%*** 33.26%*** 17.14%** -6.84%*
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 Difference(lnWm- lnWn)
Endowment
(Xm- Xn) ßm
Coefficient
Xn (ßm - ßn)
Interaction
(em - en)
C. Men
2008 23.49%*** 14.69%*** 4.83%* 3.96%*
2011 27,49%*** 19,93%** 4.02%*** 3,53%***
2013 23.76%*** 17.94%*** 7.41%** -1.59%
Note: This table reports the results of the Blinder Oaxaca decomposition. The significance level is: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; p < 0.1. 
Estimates were made per year. Column one, represents the mean outcome of the difference of the logarithm of the salary between 
the married and non-married; column two represents the endowment that is the differential of the salary attributable to the different 
characteristics among the two groups; column three represents the coefficient of the differential in the salary attributable to different 
remuneration for each marital status; and the last column represents the interactions. It takes into account the fact that it exists 
simultaneous differences between both groups in coefficients and endowments. 
Graph 1: Behavior of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition %Gap Total population
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The results for the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition are shown in Table 2.  They show that there is 
a marriage wage premium in the Colombian labor market. For 
2008 the wages for married workers are 27.2% higher than for non-married workers.  59% of 
this gap is explained by less endowments in non-married people; 27% by higher payments to married 
people if they have the same characteristics of the unmarried (employee favoritism); and, 14% for 
the interactive term.
Also, we found that the marriage wage premium increased to 34.7% in 2011. According to the 
decomposition of the differential, as stated in the Blinder Oaxaca methodology, the endowment com-
ponent is 25.3%, which denotes the mean increase in the wage that non-married people would enjoy 
if they had the same productivity or endowment as married people. Now, if the endowments were 
the same for married and non-married people there would still be a gap of 6.1% (Coefficient effect).
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Additionally, for 2013 the gap was 30.4%, which was less than previous years, showing a decrease 
in the payment to endowments (22.6%), and an increase in the coefficient (11.4%), meanwhile, the 
interactive term has somewhat of an equalizing effect on the wage gap (-3%).   
For these years the marriage wage premium is mainly explained by higher payments to the best 
endowment for married people, 59.5% in 2008, 72.9% in 2011 and, 74.2% in 2013.
Graph 2: Behavior of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition %Gap Women
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There is a female marriage premium in Colombia. The wage gap between married and non-married 
women is highly explained by endowments. As married women have better endowments that the 
non-married, their wage was higher by 24.5% in 2008, 37.8% in 2011, and 33.3% in 2013. Similarly, 
if we compare married and non-married women with the same characteristics, we found a rising 
portion attributable to better payment in favor of married women of 9.1% in 2008, 7.6% in 2011, and 
17.2% in 2013. 
Graph 3: Behavior of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition %Gap Men
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Married men earn more than non-married men;, the marriage wage premium is 23.5%, 27.5% 
and 23.7% for the years 2011, 2008, and 2013 respectively. It is important to note that the share of the 
payment for the greater endowment of married men increases from 52.1% in 2008, 72.5% in 2011 to 
73.8% in 2013.   If non-married men had the same characteristics as married men, they would incur 
a penalty of 4.8% in 2008, 4.1% in 2011, and 7.4% in 2013. The interactive term measures the effects 
of differences in endowments and coefficients that occur simultaneously, showing that if the married 
men had the same productivity as the non-married men, their wages would increase 4.0% and 3.5% 
for the years 2008 and 2011.  For 2013 the effect is not significant. 
Table 3. Ñopo Decomposition
Delta Delta O Delta M Delta N Delta X Unexplained Component
Explained 
Component
Total Population 
2008 37%
Specification 1 34% 0,08% 2,9% -0,07% 34% 3%
Specification 2 28% -6% 15% -0.03% 28% 9.%
Specification 3 23% -15% 24% 5% 23% 14%
Specification 4 9% -5% 13% 20% 9% 28%
Total Population 
2011 49%
Specification 1 49% - - - 49% 0%
Specification 2 47% -5% 8% -1% 47% 2%
Specification 3 36% -8% 11% 10% 36% 11%
Specification 4 9% -2% 5% 37% 9% 40%
Total Population 
2013 42%
Specification 1 38% -17% 21% - 38% 4%
Specification 2 36% -54% 65% -5% 36% 6%
Specification 3 40% -25% 30% -3% 40% 2%
Specification 4 18% -11% 14% 21% 18% 24%
Women 2008 46%
Specification 1 37% 14% -4% -0.3% 37% 9%
Specification 2 34% -9% 30% -9% 34% 12%
Specification 3 30% -12% 10% 18% 30% 16%
Specification 4 25% -10% 24% 7% 25% 21%
Women 2011 64%
Specification 1 60% -11% 15% - 60% 4%
Specification 2 59% -5% 10% - 59% 5%
Specification 3 57% -3% 4% - 57% 7%
Specification 4 51% -11% 17% 7% 51% 13%
Women 2013 56%
Specification 1 48% -47% 55% - 48% 8%
Specification 2 48% -47% 55% - 48% 8%
Specification 3 48% -41% 47% 2% 48% 8%
Specification 4 51% -24% 29% - 51% 5%
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Delta Delta O Delta M Delta N Delta X Unexplained Component
Explained 
Component
Men 2008 34%
Specification 1 30% 2% 2% - 30% 4%
Specification 2 22% 2% 6% 4% 22% 16%
Specification 3 20% -5% 5% 14% 20% 14%
Specification 4 6% 6% 14% 8% 6% 28%
Men 2011 39%
Specification 1 39% - - - 39% 0%
Specification 2 37% 2% - - 37% 2%
Specification 3 35% -7% 8% 3% 35% 4%
Specification 4 21% -4% 7% 15% 21% 18%
Men 2013 34%
Specification 1 32% -49% 50% 1% 32% 2%
Specification 2 30% -70% 74% - 30% 4%
Specification 3 30% -36% 21% -7% 30% 4%
Specification 4 25% -13% 14% 8% 25% 9%
Note: This table reports the Ñopo decomposition. Estimates were made per year. The columns represent the outcomes for the years 
2008, 2011, and 2013. Furthermore, the table is divided in three panels (total population, women and, men).
Specification 1: age, years of education, experience, and square experience.
Specification 2: age, years of education, experience, square experience and sectors of the economy.
Specification 3: age, years of education, experience, square experience, sectors of the economy, and urban area.
Specification 4: age, years of education, experience, square experience, sectors of the economy, urban area, and employee type.
Each panel has the decomposition of the gap in the following order: the first row represents the total wage gap, the second row the 
unexplained part of the gap, the third row is the difference between the group of married that are closer to the characteristics of the 
non-married and those that are not in the common support, the fourth row is similar to the third but for the group of non-married, the 
fifth is the part of the gap that can be explained by differences in the distribution of the observable characteristics, and the last two 
represent the percentage of individuals that are in the common support of married and non-married.  
After controlling for the set of characteristics of the total population, our findings suggest that 
married people earn 37% more than non-married people for the year 2008, 49% for 2011, and 42% 
for 2013. We can observe what happened with the unexplained component of the gap in each speci-
fication. The first specification shows that after controlling only for human capital variables, the gap 
remains unexplained, but after including characteristics  of the economy, such asurban areas and 
employee type, the gap is better explained. The values in the table show that employee type has a 
significant explanatory effect on the marriage wage premium, reducing the unexplained portion to 9%. 
Table 3 presents the results for the Ñopo decomposition.  According to Specification 4 of Ñopo´s 
decomposition, the part of the gap that shows the difference between the characteristics of married 
that are in and out of the matching with non-married people is -5% and that would disappear if the 
existence of characteristics of married are never met with the other group. The average for non-ma-
rried is 13% that represents the part of the characteristics of the non-married that are not matched 
with the married. Further, the common support of the two groups is 20%, close to the results with BO.
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For 2011, we found that the gap is 49.3% for the total population, with the married workers the 
ones that earn more. According to Specification 4, only 18% of the total gap is not explained by ob-
servable characteristics and it can be attributed to discrimination in favor of married workers, while 
Δx + Δn + Δm explain the remaining 82%. According to the Ñopo decomposition, married women earn 
about 64.8% more compared to married women outside of common support, which reduces this wage 
premium in 11%; it is also important to note that non-married women with different characteristics 
from married ones increase the gap by 17%. We also found employer favoritism for married women 
of 7%. For married men, it is important to show that the wage premium is 39.9%, but if we have a 
group of married and non-married men with similar characteristics, we observe that the wage is 
reduced by 4% for those who do not have similar characteristics, and the wage is increased a 15% 
for those who have the same characteristics as married men.  
Regarding the results obtained in 2011 and 2013 the marriage wage premium decreased 14%, 
which is particularly observable in married men. For married women this decrease is due to the ob-
servable factors Δm, while for men the distribution of a set of characteristics over common support 
for non-married and married is such that rewards of 8% go to married men. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper begins the discussion about the existence of a marriage wage premium in Colombia, an 
issue about which further research is needed, considering that Colombia has the lowest legally-ma-
rried share of the population in the world and that  a link may exist between family structures and 
poverty. Using data from the Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares for the years 2008, 2011, and 2013 
(GEIH 2008, 2011, and 2013) to investigate if there is a marriage wage premium,  we conclude that 
marital status is associated with  a “premium” for men and women in Colombia.
Married workers earn more than non-married workers, and this premium grows between 2008 
and 2011, but falls in 2013. According to Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the marriage wage premium 
is largely a reflection of married workers´larger stock of human capital. Likewise, the BO decomposi-
tion shows that the marriage wage premium is largely explained by this endowment effect, although 
there also is employer favoritism. While the Ñopo decomposition indicates a wage premium higher 
than the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, this difference occurs because Ñopo compares individuals 
within and outside of the common support, while Blinder-Oaxaca only compares average individuals.
With respect to the different characteristics of human capital, the Ñopo decomposition shows 
that the demographic area and the kind of employer explain the largest shares of the marriage wage 
premium.  If we compare individuals within the common support, the marriage wage premium is 
greater for men than for women. 
Our findings are comparable to those presented in the literature, specifically for the U.S. case in 
which the premium is between 10% and 40% for men. In constrast, for women there is a significant 
difference in Colombia where there is evidence of a  wage between 36% and 48% higher for married 
women. The studies show that marriage has a positive effect on the wages of Colombian married 
women, regardless of whether they  have children or not, which can be explained according to 
Gamboa & Zuluaga (2013).  They suggest that mothers have a lower elasticity of labor supply com-
pared to non-mothers, which does not mean that they are willing to engage in lower-paid but more 
time-flexibles jobs.
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What are the implications for public policy of these results? Although there is a positive association 
between marriage and wages, we have not established the order of causality, yet policies to stimulate 
healthy marriages could have an impact on the labor market.  Through this conduit marriage could 
have positive effects on wages, and these effects in turn could incentivize marriages, generating a 
“spiral beneficial to society”. Finally, both evaluation techniques provide evidence of a wage premium 
for marriage, explained by both productivity and the perception that market participants could have 
desirable characteristics that are associated with marriage, such as greater maturity and experience. 
Appendix: Oaxaca decomposition per characteristics 
Characteristics in 2008 Difference Endowments Coefficients Interactions
For total population
Years of schooling 27,2%***          4.78%***    20.48%**            1.76%**
Experience 27,2%*** 8.01*** -10.30% -2.74%
Experience square 27,2%*** -4.18%** 12.07%** 5.20%**
Primary (Sector) 27,2%*** -0.16% 0.41% -0.06%
Secondary (Sector) 27,2%*** 1.23%*** 2.75% -0.06%
Lives in urban area 27,2%*** 0.49%** -1.60% -0.11%
Public employee 27,2%*** 5.99%*** 0.33% 0.26%
For women
Years of schooling 36.08%***  13.16%*** 21.85% 3.09%
Experience 36.08%***   3.80%** (-33.56%*) -4.92%
Experience square 36.08%*** -0.76% 19.84%* 3.44%
Primary (Sector) 36.08%*** -0.05% -0.61% 0.03%
Secondary (Sector) 36.08%*** 1.51%** -0.92% 0.30%
Lives in urban area 36.08%*** -0.13% -3.46% 0.09%
Public employee 36.08%***     7%*** 0.67% 0.40%
For men
Years of schooling 23.49%*** 2.83%** 21.36%** 1.41%*
Experience 23.49%*** 9.57%*** -1.23% -0.38%
Experience square 23.49%*** (-5.66%**) 8.43% 4.42%
Primary (Sector) 23.49%*** -0.01% 1.96% -0.40%
Secondary (Sector) 23.49%*** 0.86%** 3.81%* -0.74%
Lives in urban area 23.49%*** 1.17%** -2.94% -0.43%
Public employee 23.49%*** 5.92%*** 0.07% 0.08%
*** p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p 0.001
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Characteristics in 2011 Difference Endowments Coefficients Interactions
For total population
Years of schooling 34,71%*** 9.47%*** 30.08%*** 4.5%***
Experience 34,71%*** 7.24%*** -2.49% -0.73%
Experience square 34,71%*** -1.95%** 4.89% 2.28%**
Primary (Sector) 34,71%*** -0.39%*** 2.03%** -0.33%**
Secondary (Sector) 34,71%*** 1.62%*** 2.46%** -0.71%**
Lives in urban area 34,71%*** 0.48%*** 1.54% 0.16%
Public employee 34,71%*** 8.83%*** -1.6%*** -1.87%***
For women
Years of schooling 47,92%*** 16.76%*** 39.61%*** 7.06%***
Experience 47,92%*** 4.82%*** -29.61%** -6.29%**
Experience square 47,92%*** -0.10% 18.34%*** 5.26%***
Primary (Sector) 47,92%*** -0.07% 1.81%*** -0.31%
Secondary (Sector) 47,92%*** 4.57%*** 3.07%* -1.44%*
Lives in urban area 47,92%*** 0.17% -4.55% -0.36%
Public employee 47,92%*** 11.63%*** -1.2%** -1.32%
For men
Years of schooling 27.49%*** 6.89%*** 25.93%*** 3.37%***
Experience 27.49%*** 8.56%*** 6.30% 2.12%
Experience square 27.49%*** -3.02%** 0.18% 0.10%
Primary (Sector) 27.49%*** -0.57%** 2.19%** -0.36%*
Secondary (Sector) 27.49%*** 0.37%*** 1.05% -0.17%
Lives in urban area 27.49%*** 0.75%*** 3.24% 0.40%
Public employee 27.49%*** 6.94%*** -1.55%*** -1.94%***
27.49%*** 6.89%*** 25.93%*** 3.37%***
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.001
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Characteristics in 2013 Difference Endowments Coefficients Interactions
For total population
Years of schooling 30,44%*** 6.68%*** 24.41%*** 2.75%**
Experience 30,44%*** 7.23%*** -34.94%** -1093%**
Experience square 30,44%*** -1.83% 16.24%** 7.90%**
Primary (Sector) 30,44%*** -0.03% 1.14% -0.35%
Secondary (Sector) 30,44%*** 2.90%*** 3.27% -1.11%
Lives in urban area 30,44%*** 0.18% -0.20% 0.00%
Public employee 30,44%*** 7.46%*** -1.61%* 1.83%*
For women
Years of schooling 43,56%*** 9.95%*** 24.15% 2.68%
Experience 43,56%*** 1.25% -45.88%* -14.29%*
Experience square 43,56%*** 3.57% 20.24%* 9.50%***
Primary (Sector) 43,56%*** -0.03% 0.06% 0.03%
Secondary (Sector) 43,56%*** 5.33%*** 1.61% -0.75%
Lives in urban area 43,56%*** 0.09% 3.01% -0.07%
Public employee 43,56%*** 13.08%*** -3.51%* -4.02%*
For men
Years of schooling 23.76%*** 6.36%*** 19.56%** 2.49%**
Experience 23.76%*** 10.48%** -34.26%* -10.44%
Experience square 23.76%*** -5.01%** 16.51%* 7.88%*
Primary (Sector) 23.76%*** 0.05% 2.21% -0.50%
Secondary (Sector) 23.76%*** 1.26%** 2.28% -0.55%
Lives in urban area 23.76%*** 0.28% -0.89% -0.05%
Public employee 23.76%*** 4.5%*** -0.34% -0.42%
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